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NLSIR
RIGHT TO EDUCATION: EDGING CLOSER
TO REALISATION OR FURTHERING
JUDICIAL CONUNDRUM?
-Aishwarya

Ayushmaan & Deepthi Bavirisetty*

This paper examines the significance of Society for Unaided Private Schools of
Rajasthan v. Union of India in the discussion surrounding the right to education.
While appreciatingjudgment' conclusions, this paper raises serious concerns
about the reasoning employed majority. The paper argues that although the
RTE Case possesses immense potential in transforming the current system of
elementary education, it not only treats crucial issues inconsistently it overlooks
established constitutional norms. This judicial haste in achieving the desired
end might result in worsening the existent confusion and further complicate an
already tumultuous right.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Indian experience in dealing with education has and continues to have a
chequered history. The idea of free and compulsory education as a fundamental
right initially came up for discussion during the Constituent Assembly debates.
Although there was general clarity as to there being two separate categories of
rights: justiciable and non-justiciable, the actual placement of the right to education became a contentious issue.' The members of the Constituent Assembly
argued that it would be inappropriate in both form and substance to word the
provision in such a manner so as to convey a constitutional guarantee towards
4h

and

3rd

year students, The W.B. National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata. The

authors would like to thank Professor Mahendra. P. Singh, Mr. Saurabh Bhattacharjee, and Mr.
Smaran Shetty for their useful insights and guidance in writing this paper. Any errors and omissions remain our own. The authors may be contacted at ayushmaan &nujs.edu.
See 2 B. SHIVA RAO, THE FRAMING OF INDIA'S CONSTITUTION 174 (2004) (The right to education was
initially placed as a justiciable right in the Report of the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights,
1947. This was however, rejected during subsequent discussions mainly apprehending the lack of
government funds for its implementation and the inability of courts to properly adjudicate on it).
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the right to education.2 It was understood to be a mere policy intended to guide
future governments.3 The importance of education in the holistic development of
the nation was, however, acknowledged and the Constitution accordingly obligated the State to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement
of the Constitution, free and compulsory education to all children until they com4
pleted the age of fourteen years.
It was not until Avohini Jain v. State of Karnataka5 that the right to education
was formally recognised. Subsequent judicial decisions such as Unni Krishnan,
J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh6, TM.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnatataka7
8
and P.A. Inamdar v.State of Maharashtra
further developed the right and laid
out the grounds for its justiciability. Yet, despite the gamut of judicial decisions,
state policies and legislative enactments, India is still far from its goal of universalising elementary education. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory
Education Act, 20099 came as an urgent measure to remedy the vast inequalities existing in the field of elementary education. Certain provisions of the Act,
however, attracted serious criticism and resistance from the academic community.
Among these provisions was the mandatory scheme of a minimum of 25% reservations in all categories of schools, including the unaided schools, for the weaker
and disadvantaged sections of the society. Consequently, the RTE Act was challenged in Society for Un-aided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India.'0
The Court, with a two-one majority, upheld the validity of the Act, exempting
only unaided minority schools from the scheme of reservation.
The RTE Case was hailed by some and criticised by others," with the
approach adopted by the judges raising several pertinent constitutional issues.
2

7 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES 538 (1989). (Pandit Lakshmi Kanta Maitra, member of the
Constituent Assembly remarked that "Part IV deals with the directive principles of State policy,
and the provisions in it indicate, the policy that is to be pursued by the future governments of
the country. Unfortunately, in Art. 36, this directive principle of State policy is coupled with a
sort of a fundamental right, i.e. "that every citizen is entitled.....etc.". This cannot fit in with the
others.").
Id. at 538-40.

The unamended Art. 45 read, "Provision for free and compulsory education for children: The
State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this
Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of
fourteen years".
5
6

7

1
9
10

(1992) 3 SCC 666 [hereinafter Mohini Jain].
(1993) 1 SCC 645 [hereinafter Unni Krishnan].
(2002) 8 SCC 481 [hereinafter Pai Foundation].
(2005) 6 SCC 537 [hereinafter Inamdar].
The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, [hereinafter RTE Act].
Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1 [hereinafter
RTE Case].
See Law
and
Other Things, Guest Post from Anup Surendranath: Evaluating
the Right to Education Judgement, Apr.
15,
2012,
http://lawandotherthings.blog-

spot.in/2012/04/guest-post-from-anup-surendranath.html

(last

visited

Mar.

1,

2014);

Centre for Law and Policy Research, Horizontal Application of Social Rights: The
Supreme Court Decision on the Right to Education, Apr. 12, 2012, http://clpr.org.in/
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This paper seeks to evaluate the judgment within the constitutional framework of
India and examine its significance within the developed jurisprudence concerning
the right to education.
II. ARTICLE 21-A & THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS
The RTE Case centres on whether the constitution permits burden sharing
with non-state actors in the realisation of socio-economic rights. It is therefore
imperative to analyse Art. 21A, from which the RTE Act flows, in order to determine first, the nature and scope of the provision and second, the validity of the
RTE Act itself.
Art. 21A reads:
"The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all
children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as
the State may, by law, determine.".
The provision, seemingly, is clear in its enunciation of legislative intent. A
closer reading of the provision, however, highlights two phrases: "State shall
provide" and "as the State may, by law, determine". The interpretation of these
phrases is open to much debate and is the focus of the discussion to follow.
A. 'State shall provide'
Art. 21-A casts an obligation on the State to provide free and compulsory education to all the citizens within the prescribed age group. The word 'shall' conveys a mandatory obligation on the State to ensure that no child, within the age
group of six to fourteen years, is denied the opportunity to attain education due
to economic incapability. 2 Clearly, a literal interpretation indicates that the provisupreme- court-upholds-the- constitutional-validity-of-the-right-of- children-to -free-and-cormpulsory-education-act-2009 (last visited Mar. 1, 2014); Law and Other Things, Continuing
Commentary on the RTE Act and SC Judgment, Apr. 20, 2012, http://lawandotherthings.blogspo
t.in!2012/04/continuing-commentary-on-rte-act-and-sc.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). But see
Sudhir Krishnaswamy & Varsha Iyengar, RTE Must be Extended to Minority Schools Also, THE
DECCAN CHRONICLE, Apr. 29, 2012, available at http://www.deccanchronicle.com/channels/cities/
bengaluru/rte-must-be-extended-minority-schools-also-796 (last visited Mar. 1, 2014); RTE Law
and a Court Judgment Won't Fix Broken Public Education System, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, Apr. 14,

12

2012, available at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-04-14/news/31342060 1 private-schools-public-schools-public-education (last visited Mar. 1, 2014); Rajeev Dhavan, Verdict
has added to Right to Education Mess, INDIA TODAY Apr. 16, 2012 available at http:/indiatoday.
intoday.in/story/supreme-court-verdict-has-added-to-right-to-education-mess/1/184642.html
(last
visited Mar. 1, 2014); Counter Currents, Supreme Court Judgment On Right to Education: Much
Ado For Nothing, May 13, 2012, http://www.co untercurrents.org/teltumbdel305l2.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
Rishad Chowdhury, "The Road Less Travelled". Article 21A and the Fundamental Right to
Primary education in India, (2010) IN. JL. CON. L. 2.
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sion casts a primary responsibility on the State and not on any private individual
or institution. An inquiry into the neighbouring provisions of Art. 21A supports
this hypothesis. 3 Each of the provisions in Part-Ill, which begin with the phrase
"The State shall", is construed to indicate that it is exclusively the burden of the
State to prevent and remedy any breach. This is in contrast to Art. 15(2) which
does not begin with the words 'the state shall 'and is, therefore, enforceable even
against private parties. 4 The only debate surrounding the interpretation of these
provisions, then revolves around the definition and scope of the term 'State'. The
enforcement of a constitutional provision against an institution is not allowed if it
does not fall within the ambit of 'the State', as interpreted by courts pursuant to a
reading of Art. 12.' 5 The RTE Act provides burden sharing with institutions, such
as unaided institutions, which do not squarely fall within such a definition. Thus,
the purport of the RTE Act is not supported by its corresponding constitutional
provision.
Accordingly, the RTE Act which was enacted pursuant to Art. 21A, has to be
anchored within the goals of its enabling constitutional provision. It would be
pertinent to note here that this conception of the RTE Act emerged during the
parliamentary debates as well, when the government conceded that it alone had
6
the primary responsibility of universalising elementary education.
B. 'State may, by law, determine'
Art. 21(A) grants liberty to the State to decide manner in which the right to
education is to be enforced. How far this liberty can be extended is, however,
a question to be answered keeping in mind principles of statutory interpretation
and other constitutional provisions. One of the prominent interpretations of this
provision strongly indicates that the State can only choose among the constitutionally permissible methods of enforcement.' The emphasis of this provision
falls on the phrase 'by law', which limits the ambit of measures that may be utilised by the state and ensures conformity with the existing legal system. Neither
of the opinions in the RTE Case denies this interpretation. The difference, however, arises in adjudicating the manner of such enforcement and particularly,
whether law permits the State to reserve seats in private unaided institutions.

13

E.g, Art. 14 begins with "The State shall not deny.....; art. 15(1) begins with "The State shall not

14

discriminate..... This is, however, not to suggest that Part III bars the horizontal application of
fundamental rights.
DURGA DAS BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 189 (2000).

15

See R.D. Shetty v. InternationalAirport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489; Ajay Hasia v.
Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722; Rajasthan SEB v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857;
Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649.

16

Discussion on the motion for consideration of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory
Education Bill, 2009 as passed by Rajya Sabha, available on http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/
psearch!Result5.aspx?dbsl-511 (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
Rishad Chowdhury, supra note 12.
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It would be pertinent to point here that Art. 21A as initially proposed in the
Parliament read as follows:
"21-A. Right to education.
(1) The State shall provide free and compulsory education to
all citizens of the age of six to fourteen years.
(2) The Right to Free and Compulsory Education referred to
in clause (1) shall be enforced in such manner as the State
may, by law, determine.
(3) The State shall not make any law, for free and compulsory
education under Clause (2), in relation to the educational
institutions not maintained by the State or not receiving aid
out of State funds."' 8
The proposed bill not only recommended the constitutionalisation of the right
to education, but also specifically incorporated the recommendation of the 16 5th
Law Commission of India regarding the non-inclusion of unaided institutions. 9
Cl. 3 was, however, not included in the final draft of the bill and eventually it
was passed as the Constitution (Eighty-sixth) Amendment Act, 2002.20 The reason for this could be attributed to Parliament's hesitation in restricting itself from
making laws regulating private unaided institutions in the future.
The majority judgment's interpretation of the clause follows on similar lines. It
holds that the State is free to determine the means to adopt in enforcing the right
to education. 2' This freedom is limited only by the provisions of the Constitution.
Whereas the majority feels that the extension of reservation to unaided schools
is constutional, the minority judge is of the opinion, in light of decided cases,
that it violates the right of unaided schools to establish educational institutions.
Thus, from the above discussion, it can be concluded that the minority and
majority judges agree with each other in their interpretation of Art. 21A, to the
extent that both allow the state to determine, by law, the means adopted to implement the right to education. They, however, differ in their conceptions of what
1 The Constitution (Eighty-third) Amendment Bill, 1997 (as originally tabled in the Lok Sabha.
The Bill was later amended and presented as the Constitution (93rd Amendment) Bill).
19 LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, 1 6 5 th REPORT: FREE AND COMPULSORY EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN (1998),
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/101-169/Reportl65.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
20 The Constitution (Eighty-sixth) Amendment Act, 2002 (art. 21A: "The State shall provide free
and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as
the State may, by law, determine.").
21 RTE Case, supra note 10, 45, per Justice Kapadia: "However, the manner in which this obligation will be discharged by the State has been left to the State to determine by law. The State may
do so through its own schools or through aided schools or through private schools, so long as the
law made in this regard does not transgress any other constitutional limitation".
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is permissible under the law and test the same against the right to establish and
administer educational institutions. The exact point of divergence in this regard is
detailed in the next section.
111. THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH AND
ADMINISTER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
In this part, we examine whether the mandatory reservation scheme for the
unaided institutions violates the right to establish and administer educational
institutions, in any manner. Consequently, the analysis centres on the following
questions: Can the implementation of the reservation scheme be considered as a
reasonable restriction on the right to establish and administer educational institutions? How does the RTE Case distinguish itself from its precedents and justify any derogation from the established constitutional principles? Finally, is there
a need for a constitutional amendment to provide legitimacy to the reservation
scheme?
A. Reasonability of The Mandatory Reservation Scheme
The right to establish and administer educational institutions stems from the
right to freedom of trade and occupation as enumerated in Art. 19(1)(g). The
strength and validity of this right has, however, always been contingent on the
question whether education itself can be treated as a trade, occupation or profession. The historical setting of education in India has influenced judicial decisions
in treating education as a noble and charitable cause, leaving no scope for profiteering. 22 The Unni Krishnan case was the first major occasion for the courts to
deal with this issue. It categorically stated that the setting up of an educational
institution could not be regarded as trade, business or commerce.23 Consequently,
it did not fall within the purview of Art. 19(1)(g). It only logically follows from
this that the Court also denied any right to affiliation or recognition. 24 Two of
the concurring judges, however, held that setting up of educational institutions
could be regarded as an 'occupation' if no affiliation or recognition was sought.
Moreover, it also formulated the 'Unni Krishnan scheme' wherein seats could be
reserved for the weaker sections of the society in private institutions in exchange
2
for affiliation. 1
The 'Unni Krishnan scheme' was rejected in Pai Foundation on the ground
that it would lead to nationalisation of education. 26 The Court also held that the
2

See Dr. Niranjanaradhya & Aruna Kashyap, The Fundamentals of the Fundamental Right to
Education in India available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001510/151010e.pdf (last

visited Mar. 1, 2014).
3 Unni Krishnan, supra note 6, 202.
14 Id.
204.
25 Id., 210, per Pandian J. & Jeevan Reddy, J..
26 Pai Foundation, supra note 7,
38, per Kirpal C.J.
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right to establish and administer educational institutions flows from Art. 19(1)(g)
as education could be categorised as an 'occupation'.2 While accepting that the
right could be subjected to reasonable restrictions in order to prevent profiteering by prohibiting capitation fees, it limited the scope of such restrictions. The
case emphasised the need to establish private educational institutions in light of
state inefficiency in providing good quality educational facilities. 28 Most importantly, the case enumerated the components of the right to establish and administer educational institutions which included the right to admit students, to set
up a reasonable fee structure, to constitute a governing body, to appoint teaching and non-teaching staff and to take action if there was dereliction of duty on
the part of any employee. 29 Moreover, it held that unaided non-minority institutions had the right to admit students of their choice subject to the condition that
the procedure employed is reasonable.30 The seven judge bench in Inamdar took
this view further by holding that the State could not impose its policy of reservation on unaided non-minority institutions.3' It held that reservation in private
schools would amount to nationalisation and would accordingly blur the distinction between government and private schools.3 2 The reasoning in Inamdar was
clear: right to impart education flows from Art. 19(1)(g) and extends to minority
and majority institutions both and therefore, it could be limited only in accordance with Art. 19(6). 33
Art. 19(6) enables the State to make reasonable restrictions in the interest of
the general public. The imposition of a licence or license system in carrying out a
trade, occupation and profession is considered to be a restriction and it is left for
the courts to test the validity of such impositions against Art. 19(6). 34 If the condition for obtaining the license is considered to be unreasonable, it can be held
to be violative of the right to freedom of trade.35 The RTE Act makes affiliation
a necessary prerequisite for setting up an educational institution. It not only prohibits but penalises the functioning of unrecognised schools3 6. Therefore, a direct
21
28
29

30
31
32

Id., 450, per Variava J. & Bhan J.
Id., 35, per Kirpal C.J.
Id., 50, per Kirpal C.J..
Id., 53.
Inamdar, supra note 8, 44, per Lahoti J.
Id., 44.

33 Id., 100.
34 D.D. BASU, supra note 14, at 335.
35 See R.M. Seshadri v. District Magistrate, Tanjore, AIR 1954 SC 747 [wherein the court inval-

36

idated a mandatory condition imposed on the licensee on the ground that it was unreasonable
within the meaning of Art. 19(6)].
RTE Act, supra note 9, §18(1): No school, other than a school established, owned or controlled
by the appropriate Government or the local authority, shall, after the commencement of this Act,
be established or function, without obtaining a certificate of recognition from such authority, by
making an application in such form and manner, as may be prescribed; §18(5): Any person who
establishes or runs a school, without obtaining a certificate of recognition, or continues to run
a school after withdrawal of recognition, shall be liable to fine which may extend to one lakh
rupees and in case of continuing contraventions, to a fine of ten thousand rupees for each day
during which such contravention continues; §19(5): Any person who continues to run a school
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link can be drawn with the licensing system and the requirement of affiliation as
laid down under the RTE Act. As a result, any condition imposed in lieu of affiliation or recognition would have to satisfy the grounds for reasonableness.
The requirement of affiliation on its own could be accepted as a reasonable restriction. However, in this case the institutions would have to adhere to
the mandatory 25% reservation in exchange for affiliation. The reasonability of
such a requirement would then be questionable, especially in the light of Pai
Foundation and Inamdar, which categorically prohibit any kind of reservation
scheme in unaided institutions in lieu of affiliation or recognition and view them
as unreasonable restrictions.
B. The Approach in The RTE Case
The majority judges in the RTE Case substantiate the restriction imposed on
unaided institutions by relying on the principle that the rights to trade and business can be curtailed to some degree in order to give effect to directive principles. 3 It is true that directive principles can be used to limit a particular right
in certain cases. There is, however, no set judicial trend or precedent for doing
so. There is no dearth of precedents where courts have taken polar views on
this issue.38 Courts generally look into each case to test the reasonability of the
restrictions imposed in the light of the directive principles. Moreover, Inamdar
specifically held that the restrictions imposed on Art. 19(1)(g) in lieu of Art. 45
of the Constitution were unreasonable and hence had to be struck down. In light
of the precedent and the absence of a fixed judicial trend, it would be difficult to
authoritatively conclude that the right to establish an educational institution could
yield to a directive principle.
Further, the majority opinion in the RTE Case, justifies the reservation of seats
in unaided institutions by adopting a two pronged approach. First, the right to
establish educational institutions could be reasonably curtailed in the interest of
general public under Art. 19(6) and in order to enforce the directive principles
of state policy, specifically, Art. 41, 45 and 46. Second, such restrictions can be
imposed in exchange for affiliation or recognition. The second prong of the argument fails because the majority fails to appreciate that the RTE Act in effect, prohibits the setting up of educational institutions without recognition. At the same
time it imposes an obligation on every educational institution, desirous of state

3

after recognition is withdrawn, shall be liable to fine which may extend to one lakh rupees and
in case of continuing contraventions, to fine, which may extend to one lakh rupees and in case of
continuing contraventions, to a fine of ten thousand rupees for each day during which such contravention continues.
D.D. BASU, supra note 14, at 257.
E.g in Inamdar, the Court refused to restrict the right to freedom of trade and commerce in lieu
of Art. 46 of the constitution, however, in State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab

Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534, the Court upheld the restriction on Art. 19(1)(g) in order to give effect
to Art. 48.
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affiliation and recognition to comply with the reservation scheme. Thus, it leaves
no choice for institutions but to comply with the mandate of the legislation or
face penalties for not being recognised. Since the requirement of affiliation itself
is mandatory in nature, the reservation scheme also becomes mandatory on all
educational institutions. Thus, the Court's reasoning that the reservation scheme
would be applicable only in exchange for affiliation, does not have any practical
grounding and fails to recognise the real implications of the RTE Act.
The first prong of the majority's argument can stand only if the constitutional
precedents in Pai Foundation and Inamdar are disregarded. The majority judgment deals with this problem by distinguishing the present case from the former,
inasmuch as the former cases applied to institutions imparting higher education
only. However, the distinction between elementary and higher education becomes
relevant only while dealing with aspects of education specific to higher education, such as the reasonability of entrance test, capitation fees and management
seats. It is true that a large part of Pai Foundation and Inamdar, dealt with issues
which confront higher educational institutions. In essence, however, these judgments held that the right to establish educational institutions flows from Art.
19(1)(g) and can be curtailed in a permissible manner. The reservation of seats
in private unaided institutions was not considered to be reasonable and permissible restrictions. This core idea emanating from Pai Foundation and Inamdar,
should apply across all educational institutions; elementary, secondary or higher
learning.
It is also important, here, to examine whether Art. 15(5) provides legitimacy
to the outcome of the RTE Case. After Ashoka Thakur v. Union of India3 9, it had
been argued by some scholars that the amendment created a distinction between
the minority and non-minority unaided institutions in as much as it constitutionally permitted the imposition of reservation on unaided non-minority institutions. 40 Interestingly, the majority judgment mentions Art. 15(5) merely to
distinguish the minority institutions from the non-minority ones and to emphasise the legislative intent to accord special protection to minority institutions. It
ignores this line of reasoning whilst dealing with the applicability of the RTE Act
on unaided non minority institutions. Instead, it relies more on the interplay of
Art. 21, 21A and 19(1)(g). A possible explanation for this could be that Art.15(5)
was brought in the context of institutions of higher education, as is clear from
the statement of objects and reasons of the 93rd Amendment Act, 4' whereas, Art.
21A, which was brought about later, deals specifically with elementary education. Understandably, the RTE Case seems hesitant in relying on Art. 15(5) for its
decision.
39 Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6
40

SCC 1 [hereinafter Ashoka Thakur].

See M.P.Singh, Ashoka Thakur v. Union of India: A Divided Verdict on an Undivided Social
Justice Measure, (2008) 1 NUJS L. Rev 193 (for a detailed analysis of Ashoka Thakur and its

interpretation of preceding judgments).

41 The Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005.
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C. The need for Constitutional Amendment
As elucidated earlier, the validity of the reservation scheme becomes questionable in the light of the constitutional provisions and judicial decisions. The
minority judgment recognises this constitutional limitation and holds that the
law as laid down in Pai Foundation and Inamdar cannot be disregarded, even
if the end sought is extremely desirable. It thus emphasises that in the current
constitutional setup, the provisions of the RTE Act would be held unconstitutional. Therefore, the only manner in which it can be brought about is by suitably
amending Art. 21A to enable the State to enforce this legislation.42
The argument for a constitutional amendment is strengthened on an examination of Art. 15(5). Justice Radhakrishnan refers to Art. 15(5) to emphasise that
the legislature has the authority to curtail the rights of the non minority institutions only by bringing about a constitutional amendment, similar to the 93rd
Amendment. However, according to him, Art. 15(5) is not sufficient to enable the
legislature to bring the unaided elementary institutions within the fold of reservation. As explained earlier, this could be attributed to the statement of objects and
reasons of the 9 3rd Amendment Act, which specifies that Art. 15(5) was brought
in the context of institutions of higher education, leaving elementary education
out of its scope. Therefore, Art. 21A requires suitable amendment to incorporate
within its fold, the power of the legislature to impose reservations on unaided
non-minority institutions.
The majority judgment fails to understand the need for the amendment as it
does not consider the Act to be transgressing any constitutional limitation. This
indicates a sense of urgency in the majority judgment to achieve the ends which
have been sought since the framing of the Constitution. But in doing so, it overlooks the role of precedents and attempt to slide out of the situation by creating
an artificial distinction with the earlier cases. The majority judges ignore the constitutional scheme to service what they perceive to be a democratic result.
IV. MINORITY INSTITUTIONS: AIDED V. UNAIDED
In the context of minority institutions, the right to set up and administer educational institutions is further supplemented by the protection accorded under
Art. 30(1). Under such a scheme, minority institutions are given added protection
against government incursions. In this part, we shall examine the inconsistency
in the court's treatment of minority institutions.

42 See also the comparison with Art. 15(5) made in the RTE Case, wherein Justice Radhakrishnan

proposes an amendment to Art. 21A, in line with Cl. 5 of Art. 15, which enables the state to
reserve seats for the socially and educationally backward classes, in order to constitutionalize the
reservation scheme proposed by the RTE Act.
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The right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions
originates from Art. 30(1) of the Constitution. 43 Pai Foundation, while dealing
with the right of minorities, held that the right to establish and administer educational institutions stems from Art. 19(1)(g), but stated that Art. 30(1) accords
minorities an extra protection and privilege. This added constitutional protection is to safeguard minority interests in a multicultural society.44A survey of
judicial decisions in this area, ranging from St. Stephen 's College v. University
of Delhi45 to Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka46 and Ashoka
Thakur,47 indicates that the judiciary has time and again examined the question
of implementing government regulations and reservation policy in such institutions. The dominant view taken by the Court has, however, been that any regulations imposed on minorities should be in the interest of minority institution.48
Moreover, the Court has been hesitant in holding that minority educational institutions are subject to the reservation policy of the State. 49 The primary reason
which influences the judicial opinion in such decisions is the apprehension that
such institutions might lose their minority character.50 Accordingly, even if reservation is allowed, it is only to the extent that it does not dilute the minority character of the institution.5'
In the RTE Case, the majority, while emphasising the fact that Art. 30(1) constituted a special category of rights which could not be easily transgressed sought
to distinguish unaided minority institutions from aided ones. In order to do so,
they placed reliance on Art. 29(2) of the Constitution, which prohibits denial of
admission in institutions maintained partly or wholly out of government funds
on certain grounds such as race, caste, religion, language.52 This clause, however,
does not dilute the protection accorded to minorities under Art. 30(1). Even while
complying with the provision of Art. 29(2), restrictions placed on minority institutions have to be reasonable. It has to be in the interest of the concerned minority group and the State has to ensure that it does not interfere with character of
the minority institution. This legal position applies irrespective of whether an
institution has been granted state funding.
To analyse the reasoning further, the majority upheld the reservation
scheme in unaided non-minority institutions but rejected it in unaided minority
13

CONSI art.30 cl.l: "All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the
right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice."
INDIA

"1 DURGA DAS BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 502-504 (2009).
45 (1992) 1 SCC 558.

46

(2003) 6 SCC 697.

'

Ashoka Thakur, supra note 39.
41 D.D. BASU, supra note 14, at 495-498.
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institutions because of the latter's minority character. Here, two distinct strands
of reasoning must be distinguished. First, in relation to public funding of institutions it was argued that unaided educational institutions could not be mandated to
adhere to the reservation scheme. The majority judgment, on this count, held that
unaided educational institutions are not exempt as Art. 21A permitted implementation of the scheme in any manner which the 'state may, by law, determine'. The
second strand of reasoning related to the nature of minority institutions where
it was argued that the reservation scheme would be violative of the added constitutional protection under Art. 30(1). The majority agreed with this argument,
and rejected the reservation scheme for unaided minority institutions Therefore, if
the majority thought it fit to declare that the current reservation scheme would be
violative of the constitutional protection accorded to minorities in case of unaided
minority schools, this should hold true even for aided minority institutions. This
is because the basis for such unconstitutionality lies in the minority nature of
such institutions (and the additional rights accordingly guaranteed) and not in
whether such institutions are publicly funded.
Thus, in the RTE Case the judiciary had two logical choices with respect to
the fate of minority institutions. First, the Court could have upheld the protection
accorded to minority institutions under Art. 30(1) by declaring the restrictions
imposed to be unreasonable. This would have relieved the unaided and aided
minority institutions from the ambit of the proposed reservation. Alternatively,
the Court could have upheld the legitimacy of the proposed reservation scheme
and declared the restrictions as not violative of Art. 30(1). This would have
broughtboth unaided and aided minority institutions within the ambit of the Act.
Instead, the majority judges chose a third option by upholding the validity of the
reservation only against the aided minority institutions,excluding the unaided
minority institutions from the purview of the reservation scheme.
Conversely, if the restrictions on minority aided educational institutions are
considered not to be violative of Art. 30(1) and are deemed reasonable, then the
same would hold true even for unaided minority institutions. The validity of the
reservation scheme would then be dependent on the relevance of the unaided status of the institutions. One, therefore, has to look into how the Court has dealt
with the applicability of the RTE Act on other unaided institutions. The majority upheld the reservation scheme for the non-minority unaided institutions on
the ground that the State was constitutionally permitted to share the burden of
realising socio-economic rights even with the unaided private institutions. If this
was the legal justification for the majority judges, then they should have had no
compulsions in allowing the reservation scheme in minority unaided institutions
as well. Neither the minority status, nor the unaided status could then serve as
the legal basis of exempting the unaided minority institutions from the ambit of
reservation.

VOL. 26

RIGHT TO EDUCATION

From this analysis, it appears that the majority judges are employing a dual
policy. It seems to propose that "restrictions cannot be imposed on institutions which do not seek government funding or recognition" in case of unaided
minority institutions but rejects the same for unaided non-minority institutions.
Alternatively, it seems to propose that "the regulations imposed in the RTE Act
violate the rights of the minority institutions" in case of unaided minority institutions while rejecting the same for aided minority institutions. This discrepancy in
the reasoning employed by the majority judgment creates an anomalous situation
wherein it becomes unclear as to which principle the Court actually intended to
uphold and apply.
The reasoning of the minority judgment seems to be clearer in this respect.
The judgment holds that with regard to the minority institutions, no distinction can be created between the aided and the unaided institutions. It rejects
the implementation of reservation policy on both aided and unaided minority
institutions as not being in the interest of the minorities and hence violative of
Art. 30(1). There is a similarity in the manner in which the judgment treats the
minority institutions (aided or unaided) and unaided institutions (minority or
non minority). This consistency in reasoning is to be appreciated in the minority
judgment, not least for its uniformity, but also for its adherence to settled constitutional questions.
Thus, we see that the majority judgment while dealing with minority rights
seeks to create a distinction between unaided and aided institutions. In our opinion, this distinction is not based on sound reasoning and its sustainability is
questionable. The lack of consistency in the reasoning employed by the Court is
evident in the majority's treatment of minority rights.
V. THE AFTERMATH OF RTE CASE
The RTE Act, upheld by the RTE Case, came to effect on April 1, 2010.

However, statistics reveal that the Act has failed to contribute significantly
towards making education more accessible and increasing enrolment rates. There
have been concerns about the lack of effective monitoring bodies, reluctance
of unaided schools in implementing the scheme, budgetary constraints, lack of
accountability and abysmal pupil teacher ratio, among others.5 3 These issues certainly necessitate a re-examination of the existing scheme and its efficacy.
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Implementational concerns aside, however, the RTE Case was challenged in
Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India, (2013) 5 SCC 752 on
the grounds that it involved a substantial question of constitutional law, requiring a five-judge bench and that the majority judgment ignored the relevant
precedents while formulating its opinion.54 The petitioners argued that the mandatory reservation scheme, enabled by Art. 21(A) violated the basic structure of
the Constitution as it interfered with the unaided institutions' unfettered right
to establish and administer educational institutions.5 5 Moreover, the petitioners
argued that Art. 15(5) violated the right to equality as enumerated in Art. 14 by
making the reservation compulsory on unaided institutions whilst leaving the
aided minority institutions out of its ambit.5 6As a result of Pramati Educational,
the Supreme Court has referred the matter to a five-judge constitutional bench
to examine the constitutional validity of Art. 21(A) and Art. 15(5), in so far as
they relate to the RTE Act. Pramati Educational contributes to the already compelling analysis that the constitutional issues raised in the RTE Case require
re-examination.
VI. CONCLUSION
The goal of universalising elementary education in India continues to be
a distant dream. Although the State is to be primarily blamed, it can be seen
as a failure on the part of parents, teachers and society as well. Reality points
towards the fact that the goal of universal education cannot be the burden of the
State alone. The RTE Case explores this crucial question. Yet, what we get as
an end product is a judgment whose conclusion can be lauded, but the reasoning
employed leave one unconvinced and dissatisfied.
The RTE Case starts on a promising note, elucidating the significance of elementary education in India and tracing the evolution of the right to education.
The rationale adopted by the majority judges, however, indicates two specific
areas of concern. First, the treatment of constitutional precedent and second, the
inconsistency in reasoning as highlighted in Part-IV of this paper. The former
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Arsenault, No High Five for RTE, THE HINDU, April 1, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion!
op-ed/no-high-five-for-rte/article4567385.ece (last visited Mar. 1, 2014; Vithika Salomi, Op-Ed,
Right to Education Failed to Deliver Satisfactory Results, The Times of India, November

23,
2012,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/patna/Right-to-education-failed-to-deliversatisfactory results/articleshow/17328840.cms (last visited Mar. 1, 2014;
Manzoor Ali, National Policy for Children 2013, High on Promises, Low on Budget,

Economic and Political Weekly, December 28, 2013.
54

Nick Robinson, Uncertainty Again Over the Constitutionality of the Right to Education Act:

55

Could it have been Avoided?, Law and Other Things, Aug. 27, 2013, http://lawandotherthings.
blogspot.in2013/08/uncertainty-over-constitutionality-of. html (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
J. Venkatesan,'Tilted' admissions law violates Constitution, say private schools, THE HINDU,
Mar. 6, 2014, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tilted-admissions-law-violates-constitution-say-private-schools/article5754327.ece (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).

56

[d.

VOL. 26

RIGHT TO EDUCATION

raises serious concerns about the significance and role of constitutional precedents and the manner in which courts choose to agree or differ with them; while
the latter is not an unheard of trend, it is something which courts should avoid.
The minority judgment, delivered by Justice Radhakrishnan becomes relevant for
recognising these issues. Ultimately, both the majority and minority judgments
exhibit a similar conception of socio-economic rights and their implementation.
It is the different treatment of these contentious issues which leads to two distinct
opinions.
A rights-based approach to elementary education needs strong judicial support for its effective implementation. It is therefore important that there be judicial clarity with respect to the content and applicability of the right to education.
Sadly, the approach adopted by the majority judges in the RTE Case, seems to
contribute to the existing judicial conundrum on the right to education and paves
the way for further litigation.

VII. POSTSCRIPT
A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Pramati
Cultural and Educational Trust v. Union of India,5 the day this article went
for publication. The Court upheld the validity of Art. 15(5) on unaided institutions and exempted all minority institutions from the purview of the RTE Act. It
opined that Art. 15(5) was an enabling provision, intended to overcome the constitutional difficulties posed by earlier judicial decisions in reserving seats for the
backward classes. Its applicability to unaided institutions would, therefore, not
interfere with the right to establish and administer educational institutions under
Art. 19(1)(g). However, the Court did not adequately address the Petitioners' contention that the validity of the RTE Act could only be determined based on Art.
21A, and Art. 15(5) would be irrelevant in the present case. It failed to explain
why a provision admittedly intended for institutions of higher education (from the
statement and object of the 9 3rd Amendment) should apply to primary educational
institutions. The Court also held that the State is free to determine the manner of
ensuring free and compulsory education to all, including the reservation of seats
in unaided institutions. Additionally, the judgment rectified the inconsistency in
the RTE Case by holding that all minority institutions would be exempt from the
purview of the Act, in order to protect their minority character. The judgment of
the constitutional bench serves as another occasion to highlight the glaring inconsistencies in the RTE Case and the inadequate treatment meted out to constitutional issues, a theme which has been the focus of this paper.
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